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ANTITRUST LAW-AFFIRMATIVE ACTS AND ANTITRUST-THE NEED
FOR A CONSISTENT TOLLING STANDARD IN CASES OF FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that "no man may take advantage of his own wrong."' It
is also a fundamental principle of the American justice system that an ex-
ception should not swallow a rule. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment
reflects the first principle: It is intended to ensure that a defendant does not
"take advantage of [its] . . . wrong"2 by permitting the statute of limitation
to be tolled when a party has concealed a wrong. Various courts have estab-
lished standards to determine when a statute of limitations will be tolled by
fraudulent concealment in antitrust litigation. The "self-concealing" stan-
dard that some courts have adopted threatens to swallow the rule established
by the doctrine. The "affirmative-acts" standard is a more moderate ap-
proach that avoids the breadth of the self-concealing approach while still
ensuring that wrongdoers will be punished for their unlawful acts.
Fraudulent concealment is often a concern in antitrust litigation. The
Clayton Act was passed in 1914 to supplement existing antitrust laws by
creating a civil cause of action for anticompetitive business practices.3 Until
1955, federal courts applied state statutes of limitations to Clayton Act
claims.4 Because that approach caused a great deal of confusion, in that year
Congress enacted section 4B, which added a four-year statute of limitations
to the Clayton Act.5 According to that provision, all actions brought under
the Clayton Act must be commenced within four years of the accrual of the
cause of action. Otherwise, the action is time-barred.
It is well established that courts may toll a statute of limitations when
the defendant has fraudulently concealed his wrongful conduct.' The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that this principle applies to all
federal statutes of limitations.8 Section 4B of the Clayton Act obviously is
such a statute. The plaintiff must prove three elements for the statute of li-
1. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959).
2. Id.
3. See Jaafar A. Riazi, Note, Finding Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Antitrust Claims
of Extraterritorial Origin: Whether the Seventh Circuit's Approach Properly Balances Poli-
cies of International Comity and Deterrence, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1277, 1280 (2005) (dis-
cussing the history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
4. Charles E. Stewart, The Government Suspension Provision of the Clayton Act's
Statute ofLimitations: For Whom Does It Toll?, 60 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 70, 73-74 (1985).
5. Id. at 74.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2009).
7. Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More
Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 830 (1983).
8. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946); see also Adam Bain & Ugo
Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes ofLimitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REv. 493, 510 (2004).
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mitations to be tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: (1) that
"the defendant concealed the conduct that constitutes the cause of action";
(2) that "the defendant's concealment prevented the plaintiff from discover-
ing the cause of action"; and (3) that "the plaintiff exercised due diligence in
attempting to discover the cause of action."9
There is a split of authority among the federal courts of appeals con-
cerning the first element of fraudulent concealment when deciding antitrust
cases.'o Some circuits hold that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
committed an affirmative act separate from the antitrust activity for the sta-
tue of limitations to be tolled." Other circuits will toll the limitations period
when affirmative acts have been committed, but do not require such addi-
tional activity when the defendant's underlying wrongful conduct is "self-
concealing."l 2 At least one federal circuit has explicitly referred to a "sepa-
rate-and-apart" standard which requires that the defendant's concealing
activity be completely separate from the underlying anticompetitive wrong-
doing but still be conducted in furtherance of the antitrust activity.'" In addi-
tion to these inter-circuit splits, many other circuits are split internally.14
This note argues that in antitrust cases, the affirmative-acts approach to
fraudulent concealment is the superior standard because it best balances the
principles that an exception should not swallow a rule and that no man
should profit from his own wrong. Additionally, sound public policy sup-
ports the application of the affirmative-acts standard to determine the first
element of fraudulent concealment.
Part II of this note sets forth a brief summary of the Clayton Act,
presents the fraudulent concealment doctrine, and surveys the circuit split
concerning which standard applies to the first element of fraudulent con-
cealment-the affirmative-acts standard, the self-concealing standard, or the
separate-and-apart standard.' 5 Part III explains why courts should apply the
affirmative-acts standard in fraudulent concealment cases under the Clayton
Act.'6
9. Richard F. Schwed, Note, Fraudulent Concealment, Self-Concealing Conspiracies,
and the Clayton Act, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 2259, 2259 (1993). In fact, there is a circuit split
concerning the first element of fraudulent concealment in many types of cases even outside
the context of antitrust law. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 34 n.103 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(adopting the self-concealing standard in civil-rights claims, but discussing the circuit split,
generally).
10. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2264.
11. Id. at 2266.
12. Id. at 2268.
13. Id. at 2268-70.
14. See infra note 79.
15. See infra Part II.




A. The Clayton Act
The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, sought to "protect consumers from
the high prices and reduced output caused by monopolies and cartels."' 7 The
legislators who drafted and passed the Sherman Act believed they were co-
difying "the common law of trade restraints."' The Sherman Act provides
only that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal."' 9
In 1911, the Supreme Court interpreted section one of the Sherman Act to
prohibit only those contracts that unreasonably restrained trade. 20 Because
the Court declared that only "unreasonable" restraints were wrongful under
the Sherman Act, many lawmakers feared that the courts would soon be
"hospitable" to large companies that were engaging in anticompetitive ac-
tivities. 21 Congress passed the Clayton Act to address the problem. 22 Rather
than banning mere "unreasonable" restraints on trade, the Clayton Act is
much more specific than the Sherman Act and explicitly prohibits the fol-
lowing activities when they are anticompetitive: price discrimination,23 t
24 . 21
ing and exclusive dealing arrangements, mergers by stock acquisition,
and interlocking corporate directorates. 26 The Clayton Act proscribes activi-
ty "where the effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition." 27
In its original form, the Clayton Act did not include a statute of limita-
tions.28 Private actions brought under the Clayton Act were, therefore, go-
verned by the statute of limitations for the state in which the suit was filed. 29
This was troubling to some members of Congress because awards of treble
damages under the Clayton Act come from "a federally accorded right of
action."30 Consequently, it seemed incongruous that private treble-damage
17. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 50 (3d ed. 2005).
18. Id. at 52.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2009).
20. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
21. 2 PILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1 301b, at 7 (3d ed.
2007).
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2009).
24. Id
25. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2009).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2009).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 13a.
28. Riazi, supra note 3, at 1280.
29. Marcus, supra note 7, at 834.
30. S.REP.No. 84-619, at 3 (1955).
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actions were governed by state statutes of limitations.3 1 The Senate felt that
this system was not only "unjust" to plaintiffs, but that it was also "unjust"
to defendantS32 because "a plaintiff injured in several jurisdictions is permit-
ted to select as his forum the State with the most favorable statute."33 The
defendant, therefore, "remain[ed] in constant jeopardy until the longest pe-
riod of limitations ha[d] transpired."3 4 The confusion was multiplied by the
fact that there was frequently a "problem of a conflict of laws in determin-
ing which State statute is controlling, the law of the forum or that of the
situs of the injury."30 Congress began the process of adding a statute of limi-
tations to the Clayton Act in 1949 and passed section 4B in 1955.36
Section 4B provides that "[a]ny action to enforce any cause of action
under sections 15, 15a, or 15c of this title shall be forever barred unless
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued."3 7 This lan-
guage served the purpose of putting "an end to the confusion and discrimi-
nation present under existing law where local statutes of limitations are
made applicable to rights granted under our Federal laws."38
B. Statutes of Limitations and Fraudulent Concealment in General
1. Why Statutes ofLimitations Are Important
Statutes of limitations serve many purposes. Most significantly, they
ensure that courts and parties will not waste resources by trying stale claims
for which the best evidence may have been lost or destroyed. As time
passes, it becomes more difficult for fact-finders to make accurate judg-
ments because both parties are unable to access unavailable witnesses or
lost or destroyed documents.3 9 Statutes of limitations also serve to "create
incentives for those who believe themselves wronged to investigate and
bring their claims promptly."4 0 The final role of statutes of limitations, gen-
erally, is to bring certainty and finality to transactions. Limitations statutes
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Atl. City Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2006). The period of four years was chosen because the commit-
tee found that state limitation periods ranged from one to twenty years, with most of them
being between one and four years. Twenty-six states had a limitation period of four years. S.
REP. No. 84-619, at 4 (1955).
38. S. REP. No. 84-619, at 4(1955).
39. W. Glenn Opel, Note, A Reevaluation of Fraudulent Concealment and Section 4B of
the Clayton Act, 68 TEx. L. REv. 649, 651 (1990).
40. 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21,1320, at 282.
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have this impact because they bar old claims "without regard to the me-
rits."AI
Statutes of limitations serve additional purposes in antitrust actions. A
limitations period is especially important "where tests of legality are often
rather vague, where many business practices can be simultaneously efficient
and beneficial to consumers but also challengeable as antitrust violations,
where liability doctrines change and expand, where damages are punitively
trebled, and where duplicate treble damages for the same offense may be
threatened."4 2 Furthermore, it is especially easy for evidence to disappear in
antitrust cases. Most cases dealing with fraudulent concealment in an anti-
trust context involve price fixing or bid rigging, a narrow type of price fix-
ing. Most violations depend, not only on the defendants' actions, but also on
"surrounding circumstances, including the behavior of rival firms and gen-
eral market conditions."43 Those types of events and conspiracies are often
difficult to reconstruct during litigation because of the number of defendants
involved and the nature of the defendants' actions." Although there are
some straightforward price-fixing schemes, the very length of many of the
opinions in these cases shows the complexity of some of the conspiracies.45
The four-year statute of limitations makes a great deal of sense in the
antitrust context because having a longer limitations period would be con-
trary to the policies underlying statutes of limitations in these cases. In cases
brought under the Clayton Act, the plaintiff is acting as a "private attorney
general," meaning that society as a whole will profit when the crime is
brought to light and stopped." The public benefit is greatest where antitrust
violations are quickly stopped.4 7 Therefore, "it would be strange to provide
an unusually long basic limitations period that could only have the effect of
postponing whatever public benefit [private enforcement] might realize."48
The United States Supreme Court considers a shorter limitations period to
be more effective in maximizing the public benefit of private antitrust
suits. 49
41. Opel, supra note 39, at 651.
42. 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21,1 320, at 282.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (sixty-eight pages).
46. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000); see also 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 21, 1 320, at 282.
47. 2 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP,supra note 21, 320, at 283.




2. A Brief Overview ofFraudulent Concealment
Traditionally, the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as a plain-
tiff can file a cause of action, regardless of whether the plaintiff knows
about the underlying facts that give rise to the action.50 However, there are a
number of equitable exceptions to this general rule, including the plaintiffs
incompetence, the plaintiffs inability to discover an injury,5' and the defen-
dant's fraudulent concealment.52 These circumstances will toll a statute of
limitations.53 The policy underlying these equitable exceptions is the need to
prevent defendants from taking advantage of their own wrongs.- Barring
valid claims because of a time lapse can be unfair to plaintiffs and may "re-
sult in hardship to the plaintiff.",5 This is why "[m]ost courts . . . have rec-
ognized circumstances justifying a judicial exception to the policy of re-
pose."56 Those exceptions allow a court to examine the factual circums-
tances of a claim. Thus, "courts have developed tolling doctrines to alleviate
the harshness" of certain applications of the statute of limitations.5 7
The equitable exception at issue in this note is fraudulent concealment.
Under that doctrine, the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff dis-
covers the wrong that the defendant has concealed in some way.58 The Su-
preme Court first explicitly recognized the concept of fraudulent conceal-
ment in the nineteenth century in Bailey v. Glover.59 The Court observed
that the idea is derived from an English chancery court rule and that the
notion is "founded in a sound and philosophical view of the principles of the
statutes of limitation."6 The purpose of a statute of limitations is to "pre-
50. Bain & Colella, supra note 8, at 502.
51. Although the discovery rule applies to many federal statutes of limitations, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has explicitly declined to read the discovery rule into all federal
statutes of limitations. Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 192 (1997) (discussing a
RICO action). Courts have also held that the discovery rule does not apply to antitrust cases.
One reason that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is so important is that plaintiffs in
Clayton Act actions are not protected by the discovery rule when they do not learn about
their injuries within four years of its commencement. See generally Mary S. Humes, Note,
RICO anda Uniform Rule ofAccural, 99 YALE L.J. 1399, 1418 (1990).
52. Bain & Colella, supra note 8, at 502-04.
53. Id. Courts can use discretion to toll the statute of limitations for many other reasons
giving rise to a great many equitable exceptions. Courts have used equitable tolling when, for
example, the plaintiff was prevented from filing an action due to war or when the plaintiff
filed a timely but defective pleading. Id. at 504.
54. Id at 503.
55. Opel, supra note 39, at 651.
56. Id. at 651-52.
57. Id. at 652.
58. Id.
59. 88 U.S. 342 (1874).
60. Id. at 349.
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vent parties from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or
impaired the evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or
had been satisfied, transferred, or extinguished if they ever did exist."6 If a
party successfully concealed a fraud until the statute of limitations had ex-
pired, then "the law which was designed to prevent fraud [would become]
the means by which it is made successful and secure." 62 In Bailey, the Court
held that fraudulent concealment could consist of either affirmative acts or
self-concealed actions. 63 However, the underlying cause of action in that
case was fraud, and many courts have been reluctant to extend the Bailey
holding to non-fraud claims, such as those under the antitrust laws.6 Shortly
after deciding Bailey, the Court decided Wood v. Carpenter6 5 involving
fraudulent concealment in which the underlying action was not fraud.66
There, the Court held that the acts committed by the defendant to conceal
his actions could "precede [the wrong's] perpetration" and that "[t]he length
of time [between the concealment and the wrong] is not material, provided
there is the relation of design and its consummation., 6 7 Most important, for
purposes of this note, the Court went on to hold that, "[c]oncealment by
mere silence is not enough. There must be some trick or contrivance in-
tended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry." 68 This language, albeit
dictum, indicates that the Court might reject a self-concealing standard in
cases that do not involve fraud as the underlying action.
The Court further solidified the foundation for the fraudulent conceal-
ment doctrine in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal,69 when it de-
clared that "'no man may take advantage of his own wrong"' 70 and that such
a notion was "'[d]eeply rooted in our jurisprudence."' 71 Later, to advance
this policy, the Court declared that fraudulent concealment should be read
into every federal statute of limitations. 72 However, the Court did not speci-
fy what type of conduct would satisfy the concealment element of the doc-
trine.
Although the same three elements must be proved when the plaintiff




64. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2264.
65. 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
66. Id.
67. Id at 143.
68. Id. This holding from Wood has even been cited in antitrust cases. See, e.g., Pinney
Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1465 (6th Cir. 1988).
69. 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
70. Bain & Colella, supra note 8, at 514 (quoting Glus, 359 U.S. at 232).
71. Id (quoting Glus, 359 U.S. at 232-33).
72. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
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inability to discover the cause of action, and the plaintiff's due diligence-
there is disagreement among the circuits concerning which standard to ap-
ply to the concealment element of this test. In antitrust cases specifically,
courts have applied three different standards to the concealment element:
the affirmative-acts standard, the self-concealing standard, and the separate-
and-apart standard.74
C. Disparate Standards for the First Element of Fraudulent Concealment75
There are three standards for the concealment element, and the two
most commonly used are self-concealing and affirmative acts. The differ-
ence between the two standards was aptly explained by Judge Higginbo-
tham in Texas v. Allan Construction Co. 7 6 An example of a self-concealing
fraud is "sell[ing] a fake vase as if it were an antique."77 This is self-
concealing because "[d]eception is an essential element of the wrong, and
one that is not intended merely to cover up the wrong itself."78 On the other
hand, an affirmative act would be to "steal a vase and to replace it with a
worthless replica."7 9 This is an affirmative act because "[t]he wrong is the
theft of the vase; the replacement is an act separate from the wrong itself
and aimed only at concealing the fact that the real vase has been stolen."80
There is a third standard, the separate-and-apart standard, and it is the most
difficult to meet. It requires evidence that "the defendants affirmatively
73. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2264. Courts also use different standards to determine the
due diligence prong of the fraudulent-concealment test. Id.
74. Id.
75. Although some circuits have well-settled case law on the issue, confusion abounds
in other circuits, even in very recent cases, further highlighting the need for consistency in
this area. See, e.g., In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 777, 788 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) ("Though Plaintiffs did not use the talismanic words 'reasonable reliance' in their
Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that they were misled by (i.e., relied
upon) Defendant's affirmative acts of concealment and that it was reasonable to do so insofar
as they allege they could not have discovered the existence of the combination and conspira-
cy alleged herein at an earlier date by the exercise of reasonable due diligence because of the
deceptive practices and techniques of secrecy employed by the Defendants and their Co-
conspirators." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); In re Monosodium Glutamate
Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 297287, *3 (D. Minn 2003) (noting that courts within the same
district have adopted an affirmative-standard, but instead choosing to adopt a self-concealing
standard); In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 370-71 (D.N.J. 2001)
(noting that "district courts in [the Third Circuit] have diverged" and adopting a self-
concealing standard, despite also noting that "secrecy is not integral to either bid-rigging or
price-fixing.").
76. 851 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1988).
77. Id. at 1529.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1530.
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acted to conceal the plaintiffs claim" and that conduct must have been
"separate and apart from the acts of concealment involved in the defen-
dants' antitrust violation."8 One of the most obvious factors in deciding
whether an action would satisfy the separate-and-apart standard is to look at
the timing of the act. If it followed the wrongful conduct, then it is often
considered to be separate from the wrongful act.82 Adding to the vase anal-
ogy, if a thief sells a fake vase claiming that it is an antique and then, under
threat of prosecution, falsifies records that might indicate the vase's authen-
ticity, the forgeries would probably be considered acts that were separate
and apart.
Circuits that use the self-concealing standard will find that the first
element of fraudulent concealment is proved "merely by proving that a self-
concealing antitrust violation has occurred."83 In contrast, circuits requiring
affirmative acts will generally require that "a plaintiff must prove that the
defendants affirmatively acted to conceal their antitrust violations, but the
plaintiffs proof may include acts of concealment involved in the antitrust
violation itself."8
1. The Affirmative-Acts Standard
Participants in a bid-rigging or price-fixing scheme can carry out acts
during the course of the conspiracy that tend to conceal the wrongful activi-
ty. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have adopted strict affirmative-action stan-
dards and consider any act that is not an element of the Clayton Act viola-
tion to be an affirmative act. An affirmative act is "an act separate from
the wrong itself and aimed only at concealing the fact that" the wrong has
been committed.86 Both of the circuits have noted further that price-fixing
and bid-rigging conspiracies are not inherently self-concealing.87 These
schemes can be successful, at least for a while, when no affirmative steps
are taken to conceal the scheme. 88
Any act intended to keep the improper behavior a secret can satisfy the
first element of fraudulent concealment, even if that act was "undertaken at
81. Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 122 (4th
Cir. 1995) (citing Colo. v. W. Paving Constr. Co., 630 F. Supp. 206, 210 (D. Colo. 1986)).
82. Marcus, supra note 7, at 858.
83. Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 122 (citing N.Y. v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065,
1084 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988)).
84. Id. (citing Tex. v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1532 (5th Cir. 1988)).
85. See Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d at 1534; Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent.
Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1472 (6th Cir. 1988).
86. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d at 1530.
87. Id. at 1531; Pinney, 838 F.2d at 1473.




the time of the conspiracy."" The smallest act, such as concealing bids in
plain envelopes rather than in company stationery, can be considered an
affirmative action.
There is some controversy over what can be considered an affirmative
act. Some circuits that have not definitively settled what standard should be
used have still concluded that certain acts are (or are not) affirmative ac-
tions. Acts that have been held to be affirmative actions include holding
secret meetings in violation of other regulations. 91 Another court held that
"the use of public pay telephones, [and] calls made to residences of compa-
ny representatives rather than to their offices" constituted affirmative ac-
tions.9 2 The destruction of records has also been found to be an affirmative
act.93 Even sending bids or other pricing information to other members of
the cartel in plain envelopes rather than on company stationery has been
held to be an affirmative act.94 A creative group of defendants developed a
code based on the phases of the moon so others would not understand their
conspiracy-related conversations.9 ' That was found to be an affirmative act
sufficient to support tolling the statute of limitations.96
The authorities are split over whether clandestine meetings constitute
affirmative actions. 9 7 There is also a division over price misrepresentations,
with one circuit holding that outright misrepresentations about prices is an
affirmative act,98 while a district court in another circuit held that letters to
customers containing misrepresentations about price increases did not con-
stitute affirmative actions.99
Although there is a split among the circuits about whether lying about
prices and market factors is enough to toll the statute of limitations, all cir-
89. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d at 1532; see also Pinney, 838 F.2d at 1469.
90. Kan. City v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 284 n.2 (8th Cir. 1962) (stating that
using plain envelopes was an "active step" in concealing the defendants' actions, though not
holding that affirmative acts are necessary to show fraudulent concealment).
91. Pinney, 838 F.2d at 1472.
92. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d at 284 n.2.
93. Id.
94. Id; In re Milk Prod. Antitrust Litig., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1023 (D. Minn. 1997).
95. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d at 284 n.2.
96. Id.
97. Compare Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 1980 WL 1819, *4 (E.D. La.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that clandestine meet-
ings in hotel rooms were not affirmative actions), with Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn
Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1474 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that leaving price-fixing meetings
off of a trade association meeting agenda was an affirmative act).
98. Pinney, 838 F.2d at 1476.
99. In re Milk Prod, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. Although the court in that case discussed
all of the factors in terms of affirmative actions, it is possible that the district court wanted to
apply a higher standard-the separate-and-apart standard-and that is why the court was
reluctant to find that the letters were not sufficient to toll the statute.
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cuits that have discussed affirmative actions have indicated that neither
denial of wrongdoing nor silence alone constitutes an affirmative act. For
instance, the Fourth Circuit has held that if a mere denial of antitrust activity
constitutes fraudulent concealment it "would effectively nullify the statute
of limitations in these cases"'0 because "[i]t can hardly be imagined that
illegal activities would ever be so gratuitously revealed."'o' The notion of
fraudulent concealment itself implies that the defendant takes actions that
would "deflect litigation."' 0 2 In most jurisdictions, signing an affidavit of
non-collusion, alone, is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, but
the Fifth Circuit has found that such denial could toll the statute in very
narrow circumstances. 03 Additionally, courts have been very clear in hold-
ing that "concealment by mere silence is not enough."104 The notion that
mere silence or denial of wrongful activity is not considered to be fraudu-
lent concealment dates back to 1879 when the Supreme Court stated in dic-
tum "[c]oncealment by mere silence is not enough. There must be some
trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry." os
Even though courts that have discussed the affirmative-acts standard will
accept the most subtle action as sufficient to toll the statute of limitations (as
long as it is not an actual element of the wrongful activity), all circuits agree
that mere silence is not enough,'0 and almost all would agree that a denial
is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, unless it is coupled with an
affirmative act.
2. The Self-Concealing Standard
The self-concealing standard requires only that a defendant's anticom-
petitive activity is performed in a way that makes it impossible for the plain-
tiff to discover the activity-no actions outside the antitrust violation itself
are required. There is one circuit that has adopted a self-concealing standard
in all situations' 07 when dealing with fraudulent concealment in antitrust
100. Pochahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218-19
(4th Cir. 1987).
101. Id. at 219.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Tex. v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (5th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that a non-collusion affidavit is sufficient only if the parties were in a fiduciary relation-
ship or if the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's affidavit).
104. Id. at 1529.
105. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879).
106. Mere silence can be enough in limited circumstances, including when a defendant
had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, but that is generally not applicable in bid-rigging cases.
Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d at 1535 n.3.
107. There are other circuits that have indicated that an affirmative-acts standard is ap-
propriate in certain instances, but they also indicate that cases might arise in which an anti-
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actions.108 The courts in that circuit base the rule on a conclusion that price-
fixing and bid-rigging conspiracies are by their very nature self-
concealing.'" In Hendrickson, the Second Circuit came to that conclusion
because, the court claimed, in order for such a scheme to be successful, it
had to remain secret." 0 If the injured parties knew about the scheme, they
would bring suit against the wrongdoers and the conspiracy would be
over."' This need for secrecy is the entirety of the Second Circuit's reason-
ing as to why bid-rigging is inherently self-concealing." 2
3. The Separate-and-Apart Standard
The separate-and-apart standard is the most difficult for plaintiffs to
meet because it requires "the plaintiff to show that the defendant concealed
the antitrust violation through affirmative acts committed wholly apart from
the underlying illegal activity."' 3 The Tenth Circuit is the only one that has
adopted such a standard, but it has been inconsistent in its opinions concern-
ing the concealment requirement in antitrust actions.114 That court adopted a
self-concealing standard in one case."' However, in a later case, the circuit
court adopted a separate-and-apart standard."' 6 In the Western Paving case,
a panel in the Tenth Circuit originally held that bid-rigging schemes are
inherently self-concealing"' and overturned the district court, which had
held that a separate-and-apart standard should be used to decide the con-
cealment element of fraudulent concealment. " However, the Tenth Circuit
elected to rehear the matter en banc. In a per curiam opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district court.19 Therefore,
trust violation is self-concealing and that such a standard for the concealment prong might be
appropriate. See, e.g., Supermarket of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119,
123 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The self-concealing standard is only even arguably proper when decep-
tion or concealment is a necessary element of the antitrust violation, i.e., when the antitrust
violation is truly self-concealing.").
108. N.Y. v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In re Nine
W. Shoes Antitrust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
109. Hendrickson, 840 F.2d at 1084; In re Nine W, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
110. Hendrickson, 840 F.2d at 1084 (citing Colo. ex rel. Woodard v. W. Paving Constr.
Co., 833 F.2d 867, 881 (10th Cir. 1987)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2266.
114. See King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1981)
(adopting a self-concealing standard). But see Colo. v. W. Paving Constr. Co., 841 F.2d
1025, 1026 (10th Cir. 1988) (adopting a separate-and-apart standard).
115. King & King, 657 F.2d at 1147.
116. W Paving Constr. Co., 841 F.2d at 1026.





according to the most recent case on the matter, plaintiffs in the Tenth Cir-
cuit must show separate acts of concealment in order to toll the statute of
limitations under the Clayton Act.120 One commentator has stated that this
case "epitomizes the confusion and diversity of opinion in this area."1 2 1 He
observed:
Although a Tenth Circuit panel reversed the district court's decision, the
grounds for the reversal were not unanimous. Two judges chose to re-
verse the district court's holding because Western Paving's conspiracy
to rig construction bids on state projects was, by its nature, a self-
concealing conspiracy. Judge Anderson, while concurring in the panel's
decision, refused to support the self-concealing conspiracy standard. In-
stead, he supported adopting the affirmative acts standard, which would
allow the plaintiff to prove fraudulent concealment based upon the de-
fendant's acts that are also a part of the plaintiff s cause of action. Upon
rehearing the case, the Tenth Circuit, by a four-to-four split vote, va-
cated the panel decision and affirmed the district court's holding. In
sum, the Tenth Circuit grudgingly accepted the ... [separate-and-apart]
standard, which requires a court to distinguish between acts of conceal-
ment that are inherent in the wrongful act and those that are separate and
apart from the original wrong and thus constitute fraudulent conceal-
ment. 122
So, although the Tenth Circuit has adopted a separate-and-apart stan-
dard for now, it is reasonable to think that the issue remains unsettled.
D. Why Statutes of Limitations Need to Be Consistent
Circuit splits concerning statutes of limitations are no more tolerable
than circuit splits concerning substantive law.123 There are several reasons
that statutes of limitations need to be consistent, including the following: to
provide guidance to courts;124 to prevent forum shopping; 125 and to prevent
inequitable results by some courts. 126 These are the problems Congress
120. Id.
121. Opel, supra note 39, at 655.
122. Id. at 655-56.
123. In passing section 4B, Congress stated that its purpose was to add uniformity to
antitrust cases. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of
uniformity in antitrust actions when it concluded that federal courts have implied exclusive
jurisdiction over antitrust cases. Although Congress has reserved exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion over certain types of actions (e.g. patent actions), the Court has only very rarely found
implied federal jurisdiction. See MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS
287 (6th ed. 2007).
124. 2 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP, supra note 21,1320, at 282.
125. S. REP. No. 84-619, at 4 (1955).
126. 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, 320, at 282.
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sought to address in passing section 4B, which was intended to bring un-
iformity to antitrust litigation.127 When courts are inconsistent in their rec-
ognition and interpretation of fraudulent concealment, then the problems
that Congress sought to remedy with the act will return.
There is also the danger that because antitrust cases involving fraudu-
lent concealment are often "inconsistent and often hypertechnical,"l 28
judges may be tempted to rule a certain way on a threshold issues, such as
statutes of limitations, because of their opinions concerning the merits of the
case. For example, if a court "believes that the antitrust claim is unfounded
[, then the court] may avoid the substantive issue by concluding that the
statute of limitation has precluded the action."1 29 Such a result leads to in-
consistencies, and encouraging judges to dispose of claims before hearing
evidence on the merits is generally unacceptable.
III. RESOLUTION
Some commentators advocate abolishing fraudulent concealment in
antitrust cases. One such author posits that the plain language of the Clayton
Act indicates that "Congress enacted an absolute limitation on a plaintiffs
right to bring suit."1 3 0 The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the
power and the right to create an unqualified limitations period that would
not allow for tolling in the case of fraudulent concealment.13 1 One commen-
ter argues that "[s]ection 4B clearly suggests that it is intended to serve as
an absolute limitations period. The statute expressly claims to be applicable
to 'any action to enforce any claim' and purports to 'forever bar' any claim
not brought within the four-year limitations period."l 3 2
This claim is easily rebutted. Most important, the Supreme Court has
explicitly held that fraudulent concealment is to be read into all federal sta-
tutes of limitations. 133 Courts have applied equitable tolling exceptions to a
variety of statutes of limitations, all of which have wording that is equally
as strong as that found in section 4B.134 Additionally, in passing the Clayton
127. S. REP. No. 84-619, at 4 (1955).
128. 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, 1 320, at 283.
129. Id.
130. Opel, supra note 39, at 662 (emphasis added).
131. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) ("If Congress explicitly puts a
limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter. The
Congressional statute of limitation is definitive. The rub comes when Congress is silent."
(internal citations omitted)).
132. Opel, supra note 39, at 662 (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Santos er rel Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (apply-
ing the discovery rule to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which has a statute of limitations that




Act, Congress intended that "private treble damage plaintiffs have been
characterized as 'allies of the government in enforcing antitrust laws."" 35 It
is often very difficult for potential plaintiffs to discover the deceit within the
statutory four years. It can certainly be said that "denying application of the
doctrine would greatly reduce potential liability and thus the deterrent effect
of the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws" because price-fixing
and bid-rigging schemes are so frequently difficult to detect.'36
Therefore, rather than simply abolishing the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment altogether, the more prudent approach is one that balances the
policies underlying both statutes of limitations and fraudulent concealment.
The affirmative-acts standard achieves this balance. Courts should apply
that approach when plaintiffs are attempting to toll the statute of limitations
due to the defendant's fraudulent concealment.
A. Comparing an Affirmative-Acts Standard to Other Standards
The affirmative-acts standard is a middle ground between the separate-
and-apart standard, which is overly friendly to defendants, and the self-
concealing standard, which is overly friendly to plaintiffs. Additionally,
though not dispositive, the fact that a majority of courts have adopted some
version of the affirmative-acts standard is strongly suggestive that it is the
superior standard.
1. Self-Concealing Standard
Anticompetitive conspiracies are not inherently self-concealing. As
one district court noted, deception is not an essential element of a Clayton
Act violation, and "[i]f [] deception is not an essential element of the wrong,
then it follows that fraudulent concealment is not inherent in every price-
fixing scheme."l 37 The federal district court in the Eastern District of New
York recently decided a case in which the price-fixing scheme was not inhe-
rently self-concealing.138 That case involved a settlement agreement be-
tween four pharmaceutical companies-Bayer, Barr, HMR, and Rugby-
wherein Barr, HMR, and Rugby agreed not to market a generic version of
one of Bayer's antibiotics in the United States. 139 In that case, the settlement
135. Comment, Clayton Act Statute of Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Conceal-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 600, 611 (1963) (citing 51 Cong. Rec. 16319 (1914) (statement of Con-
gressman Floyd)).
136. Id. at 611-12.
137. In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019, 1030 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
138. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 224
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).
139. Id. at 199.
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agreement and supply contracts between the companies "were immediately
disclosed to the public."o40 Even more important, "the 'scheme' established
by defendants would not, and in fact did not, dissolve once the agreements
were made public."'14' The Ciprofloxacin case, therefore, shows that Clayton
Act violations can be (and are) carried out in full view of the public.
It is important to note that the act of price fixing or bid rigging is the
substantively improper conduct. While some violations of the Clayton
Act-such as monopolization and retail price maintenance-do not involve
price fixing, almost all cases involving fraudulent concealment are price-
fixing and bid-rigging schemes, because those activities are most often car-
ried out under a cloak of secrecy.142 The Second Circuit's assertion that
price-fixing schemes are inherently self-concealing is simply not borne out
by the facts of actual cases. In the seminal self-concealing standard case, the
Second Circuit admitted that the defendants had committed affirmative acts
to keep the cartel a secret.143 Since Hendrickson, some courts in the Second
Circuit have stopped analyzing the concealment element of fraudulent con-
cealment altogether where the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant parti-
cipated in a bid-rigging or price-fixing conspiracy.'" This is completely
contrary to the doctrine of fraudulent concealment because not requiring a
showing of any evidence beyond the price-fixing scheme itself effectively
subverts the purpose of the statute of limitations.
The concealment aspect of fraudulent concealment is essentially ne-
gated when an affirmative act is not required. By allowing the wrongdoing
itself to toll the statute of limitations, "the abandonment of the concealment
prong substantially undermines the interest in limiting the period during
which a defendant may be sued." 45 Although many bid-rigging and price-
fixing schemes are deplorable, the mere fact that defendants have been ac-
cused of wrongdoing should not, on its own, toll the statute of limitations.
One foundational principle behind statutes of limitations is that, after a cer-
tain amount of time, reliable fact-finding cannot be conducted. In situations
where evidence has been lost or destroyed or where actions were lon ago
forgotten, "courts cannot fairly be asked to resolve ancient disputes."' 6 For
the statute of limitations in Clayton Act claims to be applied as Congress
intended, courts must "insist on a showing of some wrongful behavior by
140. Id. at 224.
141. Id.
142. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2265.
143. N.Y. v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1084, 1085 (2d Cir. 1988).
144. In re Nine W. Shoes Antitrust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 181, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that "by alleging a price fixing scheme, the plaintiff sufficiently has alleged the first
prong of fraudulent concealment").




the defendant that caused delay in filing suit and therefore outweighs the
policies underlying statutes of limitations."I 4 7 Furthermore, .
[t]he fraudulent concealment doctrine is not applicable merely because
there is evidence of secrecy, silence, concealment or other clandestine
activities by the alleged conspirators. If it were, the 4-year limitation pe-
riod Congress adopted in 1955 would be of no practical significance for
antitrust conspiracies, most of which obviously operate in clandestine
fashion, with the participants seeking to keep their covert machinations
hidden from public view.148
Allowing the concealment element to be met simply by virtue of the
fact that there was a conspiracy would, therefore, subvert Congress's intent
in passing a statute of limitations for litigating antitrust activity.
Although some might argue that adopting an affirmative-acts standard
would reward particularly clever defendants,14 9 those fears are misplaced.
Under an affirmative-acts standard, fraudulent concealment can still occur
even when acts of concealment occur simultaneously with the wrongdoing.
All that is needed is "[a]t most, some action taken by the defendant inde-
pendent of the wrongdoing, but tending to conceal it."150 The conduct can
be very subtle; it does not have to be an elaborate scheme to be perpetrated
outside the conspiracy. As the Eighth Circuit indicated, the actions that
would satisfy this standard need only be slight, such as sending letters in
plain envelopes rather than self-addressed ones.15' The example illustrates
how little is needed to show that an affirmative act has taken place. Allow-
ing any act to be considered an affirmative action as long as it does not sa-
tisfy an element of the actual antitrust violation means that such defendants
will not be rewarded because, as many of those courts have pointed out, a
price-fixing or bid-rigging scheme must be kept secret in order to be suc-
cessful.15 2 Because those schemes are not inherently self-concealing, the
conspirators must have taken some affirmative steps to keep the cartel se-
cret.
If taken to an extreme, this argument may suggest that if an affirma-
tive-acts standard is always met, then the statute of limitations will be ren-
dered meaningless, just as it would be under the self-concealing standard.
This is not the case. Courts that use a self-concealing standard do not ana-
147. Id. Wrongful behavior is required because courts have specifically and explicitly
refused to extend the discovery rule to antitrust cases and Congress has not amended section
4B to include a discovery rule. See generally Stewart, supra note 4.
148. Stewart, supra note 4, at 88 n.69.
149. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2279-80.
150. Marcus, supra note 7, at 859 (emphasis added).
151. Kan. City v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 284 n.2 (8th Cir. 1962).
152. N.Y. v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1084 (2d Cir. 1988).
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lyze the first element of fraudulent concealment at all.153 Using an affirma-
tive-acts standard and allowing subtle actions to satisfy the first element
would ensure that the defendant actually committed fraudulent concealment.
Without such a requirement, it is possible that a court could find an open
price-fixing scheme, such as the one presented in the Ciprofloxacin case,15
to be fraudulent concealment even though the actions were carried out in
full public view.
Using a self-concealing standard would leave defendants "virtually
powerless to assure themselves of the protections of limitations."155 Those
protections extend to plaintiffs and the court system, as well. As discussed
above, one of the most important policies underlying statutes of limitations
is the desire not to litigate stale claims in which evidence has been lost or
destroyed and memories have faded.'56
Furthermore, considering the crime itself to be an act of concealment is
akin to treating silence as an act of wrong-doing. In most legal contexts,
silence is not enough to be considered an act of wrongdoing, 5 7 and many
circuits agree that silence alone should not constitute fraudulent conceal-
ment in an antitrust action. 158 As one scholar has noted, "'[i]t is in the nature
of a conspiracy that there be secrecy; mere nondisclosure or denial of the
existence of a conspiracy does not constitute fraud or deceit for tolling pur-
poses."" 59 "'If it did, the tolling exception to the statute of limitations
would eclipse the basic statute itself" in the violations that include price-
fixing and bid-rigging.16t The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is wea-
kened when silence is treated as an act of concealment because "tolling
when the defendant's only act to conceal has been 'mere silence' effectively
eliminates concealment as an independent requirement of the fraudulent
concealment doctrine."' 6'
Another argument against the self-concealing standard is that it direct-
ly assaults one of the primary purposes of statutes of limitations-to prevent
plaintiffs from dredging up old claims. That is because a self-concealing
standard allows "indefinite tolling when a defendant does not need to act
153. In re Nine W. Shoes Antitrust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
154. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188,
224 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
155. Marcus, supra note 7, at 871.
156. Opel, supra note 39, at 651.
157. Silence can be considered an act of wrongdoing when the defendant had some duty
to disclose a material fact, such as in a fiduciary relationship. Tex. v. Allan Constr. Co., 851
F.2d 1526, 1533 (5th Cir. 1988).
158. See discussion supra p. 11.
159. Marcus, supra note 7, at 859 (quoting Hall v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 312
F. Supp. 358, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)).
160. Id. (quoting Hall, 312 F. Supp. at 362).
161. Id. at 865.
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affirmatively to conceal the violation."1 62 Defendants would be forced to
fight claims in which evidence has been irretrievably lost and possibly long
past the point at which the transactions became final.
Finally, and most important, using a self-concealing standard does not
comport with existing Supreme Court decisions. The doctrine of fraudulent
concealment was first recognized by the Court in Bailey v. Glover,163 a case
involving fraud. The Court held that fraudulent concealment could be met
through either self-concealing or affirmative actions.'6 Courts and com-
mentators have properly distinguished that case from antitrust cases because
the underlying action in Bailey was fraud, and anticompetitive activity is
not, on its face, fraudulent.'6 ' This distinction has merit, given that the Court
decided a later case involving fraudulent concealment that was not based on
an underlying claim of fraud.'66 There, the Court stated that "[c]onceal-
ment by mere silence is not enough. There must be some trick or contriv-
ance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry." 67 This powerful
dictum indicates that the Court would reject a self-concealing standard in
cases that do not involve fraud as an underlying action. Such a conclusion
would satisfy both stare decisis and the policies underlying statutes of limi-
tations.
2. Separate-and-Apart Standard
The primary reason that the separate-and-apart standard is unaccepta-
ble is that the Supreme Court has never recognized that standard in its deci-
sions concerning fraudulent concealment. The Court seemed to advocate for
an affirmative-acts or self-concealing standard in Bailey and in Holmberg v.
Armbrecht,'68 the two seminal cases concerning fraudulent concealment.
Those cases do not indicate that a more difficult standard for plaintiffs
would ever be appropriate in fraudulent concealment cases. In Bailey, for
example, the Court stated that the fraudulent concealment had occurred
"'when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal
itself."'l 69 Holmberg also does not refer to a more difficult standard for
plaintiffs to meet beyond the affirmative-acts standard. Likewise, Wood v.
Carpenter "0 advocates the affirmative-acts standards. Because the Court
162. Opel, supra note 39, at 658.
163. 88 U.S. 342 (1874).
164. Id. at 349.
165. Schwed, supra note 9, at 2264.
166. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
167. Id. at 143. This holding has been cited by circuit courts in antitrust cases. See supra
note 68.
168. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
169. Opel, supra note 39, at 656 (quoting Bailey, 88 U.S. at 349-50 (1874)).
170. 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
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has not applied the separate-and-apart standard to cases involving fraudulent
concealment, the circuits should also refrain from doing so.
Furthermore, whereas the self-concealing standard requires too little of
plaintiffs, the separate-and-apart standard goes to the other extreme and asks
too much of plaintiffs. Most acts taken in furtherance of a conspiracy are so
intertwined with the conspiracy itself that it would be very difficult for
plaintiffs to come up with actions that are sufficiently removed from the
conspiracy to not be considered in furtherance of the conspiracy. As one
author pointed out, "every act of concealment can be characterized as part
of the base violation in the sense that the success of the defendant's wrong-
ful act depends on its continued concealment."' 7' Thus, a separate-and-apart
standard effectively eliminates tolling due to fraudulent concealment in
many cases.
Scholars have pointed out the extreme difficulty of deciding whether
certain conduct was committed in furtherance of a conspiracy or if it was
undertaken outside of the conspiracy. 172 Attempting to classify certain acts
as separate and apart when the defendants have clearly been acting inappro-
priately can lead to a great deal of inconsistency because such a classifica-
tion is "a subjective judicial judgment that does little to promote certain-
ty."173 The ease of applying a certain standard is a legitimate concern for
courts, because a standard that is difficult to apply will invariably lead to
inconsistent results. As discussed above, desire for uniformity was a prima-
ry reason that Congress passed section 4B. Courts should respect Con-
gress's intent when interpreting a statute, 17 4 and courts should be hesitant to
implement a standard that would give rise to inconsistency under the Clay-
ton Act. Under the affirmative-acts standard, courts do not have to conduct
highly technical, but often inconsistent, analyses to determine whether an
incident was far enough removed from the wrongdoing to constitute a whol-
ly separate course of events. Instead, the court can focus on "the practical
problem of whether the defendant concealed the offense from the plain-
tiff."75
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide finality and certain-
ty to all parties in litigation. However, the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment ensures that defendants cannot profit from their own wrongdoing by
concealing their crimes until the statute has passed. Requiring plaintiffs to
171. Opel, supra note 39, at 657.
172. 2 AREEDA&HOVENKAMP,supra note 21, at 283.
173. Opel, supra note 39, at 657.
174. Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
175. Opel, supra note 39, at 661.
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provide evidence sufficient to meet the affirmative-acts standard for the
concealment element of fraudulent concealment provides the correct bal-
ance between the policies underlying statutes of limitations and fraudulent
concealment.
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